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I. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
A. Nature of the Case: 
This appeal concerns the Conclusions of Law reached by the magistrate court in its 
November 20, 2007 Order Granting in Part and Denying in Part Plaintiff's Motion to Divide 
Omitted Asset, and subsequently thereto, the district court's September 10, 2008 Decision on 
Appeal. (R., 00030-00042, and 00052-00066.) 
B. Course of Proceedings: 
The course of proceedings began with the Judgment and Decree of Divorce entered on 
September 22,2005. (R., 00019-00029.) 
On March 24, 2006, Plaintiff, Debra A. Borley (hereinafter "Debra"), filed a Motion to 
Divide Omitted Asset. (Augmented Record YA.R."], No. 1 .) 
On April 18, 2006, Defendant, Kevin D. Smith (hereinafter "Kevin"), filed an Answer to 
Debra's Motion to Divide Omitted Asset. (R., 00004.) 
The Court set a final hearing on Debra's Motion to Divide Omitted Asset for August 28, 
2006. (R., 00030.) 
On August 28, 2006, Debra renewed her request to vacate the trial based on the fact that 
Kevin had failed to answer discovery that was pertinent to the conclusion of Debra's case. (R., 
00030.) After considering Debra's renewed request for a continuance based on Kevin's failure 
to respond to discovery, the court vacated the trial and directed that Kevin respond to all 
outstanding discovery. (R., 00030.) 
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On September 8,2006, Kevin filed a Motion to Dismiss, claiming that there had been no 
assets omitted and also that the court lacked jurisdiction to hear this case. (R., 00030) 
On September 27, 2006, the court reset Debra's Motion to Divide Omitted Asset for trial 
on April 27,2007. (R., 00030.) 
On October 10, 2006, the date set for the hearing on Kevin's Motion to Dismiss, neither 
party appeared, and therefore Kevin's Motion was deemed withdrawn. (R., 00030-00031 .) 
On March 27, 2007 (30 days prior to the trial date), Kevin filed a Motion for Summary 
Judgment with a supporting brief and affidavit. (R., 0003 1 .) 
On April 16, 2007, Debra filed an objection and response to the Motion for Summary 
Judgment, claiming that pursuant to the Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure, Kevin's Motion for 
Summary Judgment could not he brought since it was less than 60 days prior to the trial date. 
(R., 0003 1 .) 
Afrer convening a status conference with counsel for each party, the court determined 
that Debra's objection to the timeliness of the Motion for Summary Judgment was proper. (R., 
0003 1.) Each party, however, informed the court that they would submit a set of stipulated facts 
from which the court could decide on the appropriateness of Debra's Motion to Divide Omitted 
Asset. (R., 0003 1 .) Thereafter, the court decided that it would treat the case as one having been 
submitted on cross motions for summary judgment. (R., 0003 1 .) 
Based on counsel's representations, the court vacated the hearing on Debra's Motion to 
Divide Omitted Asset, which was set for April 27,2007. (R., 0003 1 .) 
On July 19,2007, the court entered a final briefing schedule which required the stipulated 
set of facts be filed no later than August I ,  2007. (R., 0003 1 .) The court required each party to 
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file simultaneous briefs on August 13, 2007, setting forth their respective positions regarding 
Debra's Motion to Divide Omitted Asset, and required that any reply brief be submitted no later 
than August 29,2007. (R., 0003 1 .) 
In addition to the stipulated set of facts, the court indicated that it would consider the 
affidavits of both parties, excerpts from depositions of both parties, and documents received 
through discovery which were provided to Kevin through his employment with United Airlines 
as a pilot, both during and after the marriage of the parties. (R., 00032.) 
On August 1,2007, Plaintiffs and Defendant's Stipulated Facts were filed. (R., 0003 1.) 
On August 13, 2007, Debra filed Plaintiffs Memorandum in Support of Motion to 
Divide Omitted Asset. (A.R., No. 17.) 
On August 13,2007, Kevin filed a Supplemental Memorandum in Support of Motion for 
Summary Judgment. (A.R., No. 12.) 
On August 29, 2007, Debra filed Plaintiffs Short Reply to Defendant's Supplemental 
Memorandum in Support of Motion for Summary Judgment. (A.R., No. 18.) 
On October 10, 2007, the magistrate court entered its Memorandum Decision. (R., 
00030-00042.) 
On November 20, 2007, the magistrate court entered its Order Granting in Part and 
Denying in Part Plaintiffs Motion to Divide Omitted Asset. (R., 00043-00045.) 
On or about November 28,2007, Kevin filed a Notice of Appeal to the district court. (R., 
00046-00048.) 
On December 4, 2007, Kevin filed a Memorandum of Costs and Affidavit of Derek Pica 
in the magistrate court. (A.R., Nos. 20, 21 .) 
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On December 4, 2007, Debra filed a Memorandum of Costs and Attomey Fees in the 
magistrate court. (A.R., No. 19.) 
On December 7,2007, Kevin filed an Objection to Plaintiffs Memorandum for Attomey 
Fees and Costs in the magistrate court. (A.R., No. 22.) 
On December 13,2007, Debra filed an Objection to Memorandum of Costs and Affidavit 
of Derek Pica in the magistrate court. (A.R., No. 23.) 
On December 28, 2007, Debra filed a Notice of Cross Appeal to the district court. (R., 
00049-0005 1 .) 
On January 29, 2008, the parties filed a Stipulation for Extension of Time to File 
Respondent's Brief in the district court. (R., 00007.) 
On January 3,2008, Kevin filed Appellant's Brief in the district court. (A.R., No. 25.) 
On January 3 1, 2008, the district court entered an Order Granting Extension of Time to 
File Respondent's Brief. (R., 00007.) 
On February 7,2008, Debra filed Cross-Appellant's Brief in the district court. (A.R., No. 
28.) 
On February 28, 2008, the court entered its Order Denying Attomey Fees in the 
magistrate court. (A.R., No. 24.) 
On February 28,2008, Kevin filed Cross Respondent's Brief in the district court. (A.R., 
No. 29.) 
On February 29, 2008, Debra filed Respondent's Brief in the district court. (A.R., No. 
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On March 21, 2008, Kevin filed Appellant's Reply Brief in the district court. (A.R., No. 
27.) 
On September 10, 2008, the district court filed its Decision on Appeal. (R., 00052- 
00066.) 
On October 8, 2008, Kevin filed a Notice of Appeal to the Idaho Supreme Court. (R., 
00067-00069.) 
On October 29, 2008, Debra filed a Notice of Cross-Appeal to the Idaho Supreme Court. 
(R., 00070-00072.) 
On or about February 3, 2009, Kevin filed a Motion for Extension of Time in which to 
file Appellant's Brief. 
On February 4, 2009, the parties filed a joint Stipulation to Augment Record in the 
Supreme Court. (A.R., 7 1). 
On February 4, 2009, the Supreme Court filed its Order Granting Extension of Time 
(CV). 
On February 11, 2009, the Supreme Court filed its Order Granting Motion to Augment 
and to Suspend the Briefing Schedule. (A.R., 7 1.) 
On March 10,2009, Kevin filed Appellant's Brief. 
On April 3,2009, Debra filed a Motion for Extension of Time to File RespondentICross- 
Appellant's Brief, and Affidavit of Matthew R. Bohn in Support of Motion for Extension of 
Time to File RespondentICross-Appellant's Brief. 
On April 7, 2009, this Court entered its Order Granting Extension of Time - Brief(s) on 
Cross-Appeals. 
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C. Sti~ulated Facts: 
1. Kevin and Debra were common law married on August 1, 1988 and ceremonially 
married on or about June 4, 1994. (R., 0002 1,n 1 .O1 and A.R., 10, p. 1 ,y  2.) 
2. Kevin began working as a pilot for United Airlines ("United") in October 1990. 
(A.R., No. 10, p. 2 ,7  2.) 
3. On or about December 9,2002, United filed for bankruptcy protection. (A.R., No. 
4. As a result of United seeking bankruptcy protections, "[The] pilots agreed to 
concessions including reduced pay, loss of work benefits, and loss of pensions in 
the 2003 restructured agreement." (A.R., No. 10, p. 2,n 4.) 
5. In May of 2001, United stated that if the pilots' "A Plan" (Defined Benefit 
Retirement Plan) was terminated, its pilots would be compensated as follows: 
7. Convertible Notes. In the event that the A Plan is 
terminated pursuant to 29 U.S.C. § 1341 or 3 1342 following 
judicial approval of such termination, the Revised 2003 Pilot 
Agreement and the Plan of Reorganization shall provide for 
the issuance of $550 Million of UAL convertible notes as 
described in Exhibit " D  to this letter of agreement to a trust 
or other entity designated by the Association. The terms of 
the UAL convertible notes described in Exhibit '9" shall be 
subject to mutually acceptable modifications to optimize 
implementation for all parties from an accounting, securities 
law and tax law perspective. 
6. The pilots' A Plan was terminated by the Bankruptcy Court effective December 30, 
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7. After termination of the A Plan on December 30, 2004, the Pension Benefit 
Guarantee Corporation Insurance System replaced, in limited part, the pension 
benefits the pilots had accrued under the A Plan through December 30, 2004. 
(A.R., No. 10, p. 3,1[ 7.) 
8. On September 22, 2005, Debra and Kevin were divorced pursuant to a Judgment 
and Decree of Divorce which, in pertinent part, set forth the following: 
2. PROPERTY SETTLEMENT AGREEMENT: The 
Property Settlement Agreement dated September 15, 2005 is 
approved by this court. The Property Settlement Agreement is 
approved by this Court, but it is not merged nor incorporated into 
this Judgment and Decree of Divorce. A copy of that Agreement is 
attached hereto. The parties have provided all of the terms of the 
said Agreement. 
2. TRANSFERS TO WIFE: The Husband hereby 
agrees to, and by this Agreement he does hereby transfer, 
assign and convey unto the Wife as her sole and separate 
property, and does hereby forever waive any and all rights 
in and to, the items more particularly described as follows: 
2.01 Attached hereto and by this reference 
incorporated herein, is a Property and Debt 
Schedule (hereinafter referred to as PDS). Wife is 
awarded the items under the column entitled "To 
Wife" as indicated with a dollar amount or an "x". 
2.02 Any other property in her possession or 
under her control except those items specifically 
being awarded to the Husband. 
3. TRANSFERS TO HUSBAND: The Wife hereby 
agrees to, and by this Agreement she does hereby transfer, 
assign and convey unto the Husband as his sole and 
separate property, and does hereby forever waive any and 
all rights in and to, the items of property more particularly 
described as follows: 
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3.01 Attached hereto and by this reference 
incorporated herein, is a Property and Debt 
Schedule (hereinafter referred to as PDS). Husband 
is awarded the items under the column entitled "To 
Husband" as indicated with a dollar amount or an 
6' 9, X .  
3.02 Any other property in his possession or 
under his control except those items specifically 
being awarded to the Wife. 
4. DIVISION OF RETIREMENT BENEFITS. 
Husband has been employed by United Airlines and has a 
pension, either with united ~ k i n e s ,  or now with Pension 
Benefit Guarantee Association. Wife shall receive fifty 
percent (50%) of the benefit accumulated by Husband 
during the marriage to be set over to her pursuant to a In 
order for a pilot to receive stock distributions/allocations, 
said pilot must have been employed on May 1, 2003. 
Qualified Domestic Relations Order. 
10. AGREEMENT TO BE MERGED: The parties 
hereto agree that in the event a divorce is entered, the 
original of this Agreement will be submitted to the court for 
approval and the parties hereto will request that this 
Agreement be merged and incorporated and made a part of 
the Judgment and Decree of Divorce. 
13. SEPARATE PROPERTYRNCOME AFTER 
SIGNING OF AGREEMENT: The parties hereto 
stipulate and agree that from and after the date of the 
signing of this Agreement, any and ail property or income 
acquired or earned by either party hereto shall be the 
separate property of the party who has acquired or earned it 
and the other party shall have no claim thereon. The parties 
agree that any income earned by either party after the date 
of signing this Agreement shall be the separate property of 
the party earning the income, and any income on separate 
property shall be separate property from and after the date 
of signing this agreement. 
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15. MISCELLANEOUS PROVISIONS: 
* * *  
15.04 Each of the parties hereto represents to the other 
that they have made full disclosure of all community assets 
and community liabilities of which they are aware. 
(A.R., No. 10, p. 3-5,y 8.) 
9. Pursuant to the Revised 2003 Pilot Agreement, on or about February 9, 2006, 
Kevin received 1,616 shares of United stock (known as the stock 
allocationsldistributions referenced in paragraph 16 herein (hereafter "stock 
allocations"), valued at approximately $27 per share. (A.R., No. 10, p. 5,7 9.) 
10. In addition to the stock allocations, Kevin also received convertible notes (know6 
as the convertible note allocationsldistributions (hereafter "convertible notes") in 
February of 2006 valued at $30,707.36 directly deposited into a Schwab IRA 
account and received an additional $25,229.84 in convertible notes in March of 
2007. These convertible notes represented United's attempt to compensate the 
pilots for the loss of their A plan. (A.R., No. 10, p. 5,y 10.) 
11. Kevin received an additional 406 shares of stock as part of the stock allocations, 
valued at approximately $27 per share. (A.R., No. 10, p. 5,T 11 .) 
12. Kevin received additional stock distributions as part of the stock allocations, but is 
unsure as to the number of shares, value, etc. (A.R., No. 10, p. 5,y 12.) 
13. On June 23, 2006, United represented that the convertible notes received by their 
pilots represented consideration for the loss of their "A Plan." Pursuant to a 
"question and answer" outline, United stated the following: 
Question 1:  I understand that eligible pilots will receive 
cash proceeds from the ALPA convertible note sometime in 
August 2006. Why am I receiving these proceeds? 
Answer 1: As part of the Bankruptcy Exit 
Agreement, [the pilots] negotiated the right to 
receive $550M, face amount, in Senior Subordinated 
Convertible Notes to be issued by UAL not later 
than 100 days after exit from bankruptcy. The MEC 
. . . adopted an allocation methodology under which 
the Notes [would] be sold as soon as possible after 
issuance and the net proceeds of the sale . . . applied 
as a partial offset to the losses suffered by the pilots 
as a result of termination of [their] A plan. 
14. In order for a pilot to be eligible to receive the stock allocations, said pilot must 
have been employed on May 1, 2003. For the pilot to actually receive any of the 
stock allocations, the pilot must have been employed by United Airlines on 
February 1, 2006. (A.R., No. 10, p. 6,7 14.) 
15. The stock allocations that each eligible pilot received attempted to compensate the 
pilots for the work rules, compensation, and work benefits that each pilot lost as a 
result of restructuring their collective bargaining agreement, which is to run from 
May 1,2003 through December 3 1,2009. (A.R., No. 10, p. 6,715.) 
16. In order for a pilot to receive the convertible notes, said pilot must have been 
employed on February 1,2006, and have been a qualifted member of the "A Plan" 
as of December 30,2004. (A.R., No. 10, p. 6,7 16.) 
17. In determining a pilot's share of the convertible notes, United took into account 
each pilot's age, years left to retirement (which is reached at age 60) and seniority. 
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United projected that the more seniority a pilot had, the greater the projection as to 
the aircraft that helshe would be flying at retirement. A pilot projected to be flying 
a 777 at the time of his retirement versus a pilot that would be 'flying an A320 
would be entitled to a greater allocation of convertible notes assuming that the 
pilots were of the same age. The one with greater seniority would be projected to 
be flying a more advanced aircraft with higher pay. (A.R., No. 10, pp. 6-7,117.) 
18. Once a pilot received either the convertible notes, and/or the stock allocations, he 
could immediately cease his employment without any obligation to return any of 
the originating funds from the convertible notes andlor stock allocations. (A.R., 
No. 10, p. 7,T 18.) 
19. Kevin remains employed by United as a pilot. (A.R., No. 10, p. 7 , 1  19.) 
D. Additional Facts Available to the Magistrate Court: 
The convertible notes and stock allocations were not included in the Property Settlement 
Agreement by Debra because she forgot about them as she was "emotionally distraught" due to 
Kevin's infidelity. (A.R., No. 10, p. 7 , 7  21, and A.R., No. 16, Exh. 5 (Deposition of Debra A. 
Borley, taken February 9, 2007, p. 19, L1. 13-25, p. 20, L1. 1-2).) Kevin did not volunteer the 
information concerning the convertible notes and stock allocations at the time the Property 
Settlement Agreement was prepared, and Debra had forgotten about the information. (A.R., No. 
10, p. 7 , 1  21, and A.R., No. 16, Exh. 5 (Deposition of Debra A. Borley, taken February 9,2007, 
p. 19, L1. 13-25, p. 20, L1. 1-2).) 
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ADDITIONAL ISSUES ON APPEAL 
A. Is Debra entitled to an award of attorney fees and costs on appeal 
pursuant to Idaho Appellate Rules 35(a)(5), 40, 41 and paragraph 
15.03 of the Property Settlement Agreement? 
Yes, Debra should be awarded her attorney fees and costs pursuant to Idaho Appellate 
Rules 35(a)(5), 40 and 41, and paragraph 15.03 of the Property Settlement Agreement, attached 
to the September 22,2005 Judgment and Decree of Divorce, which states the following: 
15.03 If an action is instituted to enforce any of the terms of this 
Agreement, then the losing party agrees to pay to the prevailing 
& all costs and attorneys' fees incurred in that action. 
(September 22, 2005, Judgment and Decree of Divorce, Property Settlement Agreement, 
15.03.) (emphasis added). 
In the instant matter, it is beyond question that Debra should be considered the prevailing 
party and be awarded her attorney fees on this appeal. On November 20, 2007, the magistrate 
court entered an order granting in part and denying in part Plaintiffs Motion to Divide an 
Omitted Asset. In other words, Debra went from having no interest in the United settlement to 
being awarded a significant interest therein. Clearly, she should be considered the prevailing 
party pursuant to paragraph 15.03, cited above, as the prevailing party. Consequently, Debra 
should be awarded all costs and attorney fees incurred in this appeal. 
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111. 
STANDARD OF REVIEW 
"In an appeal from an order of summary judgment, this Court's standard of review is the 
same as the standard used by the trial court in ruling on a motion for summary judgment." 
Infanger v. City of Salmon, 137 Idaho 45, 44 P.3d 1100 (2002), citing Eagle Water Co., Inc. v. 
Roundy Pole Fence Co., Inc., 134 Idaho 626,7 P.3d 1103 (2000). 
As this Court is well aware, under Rule 56, I.R.C.P., summary judgment is appropriate 
where the pleadings, depositions, and admissions on file, together with affidavits, if any, show 
that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to 
judgment as a matter of law. McColm-Traska v. Baker, 88 P.3d 767 (Idaho 2004), Gardner v. 
Evans, 110 Idaho 925, 929, 719 P.2d 1185, 1188 (1986), Sewell v. Nielsen, Monroe, Inc., 109 
Idaho 192, 706 P.2d 81 (Ct. App. 1985); Arnold v. Diet Center, Inc., 1 13 Idaho 58 1, 746 P.2d 
1040 (Ct. App. 1987). 
"The motion for summary judgment provides a more expeditious and effective procedure 
for quickly terminating an action that does not appear to entitle the plaintiff to relief on its 
substantive merits." Harper v. Harper, 122 Idaho 535,538,835 P.2d 1346, 1349 (Ct.App 1992 
Pertinent to this case, if an action will be tried before the Court without a jury, the judge 
is constrained to draw inferences in favor of the party opposing a motion for summary 
judgment. Rather, the judge is free to arrive at the most probable inferences to be drawn from 
uncontroverted evidentiary facts. (See, Riverside Development Co. v. Ritchie, 103 Idaho 515, 
650 P.2d 657 (1982); see also, Anderson v. Farm Bureau Mutual Ins. Co., 112 Idaho 461, 732 
P.2d 699 (Ct.App. 1987). 
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Further, the Idaho Supreme Court has "repeatedly stated that when reviewing a decision 
of the district court acting in its appellate capacity, this Court will review the record and the 
magistrate court's decision independently of, but with due regard for, the district court's 
decision." Losser v. Bradstreet, 145 Idaho 670, 672, 183 P.3d 758, 760 (2008). Succinctly 
stated: 
[tlhe Supreme Court reviews the trial court's (magistrate) record to 
determine whether there is substantial and competent evidence to 
support the magistrate court's findings of fact, and whether the 
magistrate's conclusions of law follow from those findings. If 
those findings are so supported and the conclusions follow 
therefrom, and if the district court affirmed the magistrate's 
decision, we affirm the district court's decision as a matter of 
procedure. 
Id. at 672. 183 P.3d at 760. 
In this case, the magistrate court and the district court considered and reviewed the 
Stipulated Facts dated August 1, 2007; considered the affidavits of both parties, excerpts from 
depositions of both parties, and documents received through discovery which were provided to 
Kevin through his employment with United as a pilot, both during and after the parties' 
mmiage. (R., 00030-00042, and R., 00052-00058.) After reviewing this information, the lower 
courts held as follows: 
1. Magistrate Court: Determined that Debra's Motion to Divide an Omitted Asset, 
as it pertained to the convertible notes, should be granted, and determined that Debra's Motion to 
Divided an Omitted Asset, as it pertained to the stock allocations, should be denied. (R., 00043- 
00045.) 
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2. District Court: Affirmed the magistrate court's opinion with respect to the 
convertible notes, but ordered that the "accrued benefit method" be utilized as opposed to the 
lower court's utilization of a modified "time rule method." (R., 00063-00064.) The district 
court also held that the stock allocations constituted an omitted asset, and ordered that the 
magistrate court should "determine what portion of the stock allocations were 'earned' before 
September 22, 2005, the date of divorce, and then divide that portion between the parties as 
equity requires." (R., 00064-00065.) 
111. 
ARGUMENT 
1.  Neither the Magistrate Court nor the District Court Erred When 
It Determined that the Propertv Settlement Agreement Was 
Merged into the Judgment and Decree of Divorce. 
Contrary to Kevin's assertion, there is no clear and convincing evidence supporting the 
non-merger of the Property Settlement Agreement. Paragraph 10 of the Property Settlement 
Agreement specifically states that it is to be merged into the Judgment and Decree of Divorce. 
(R., 00024,1 lo.) Each party executed this document before a notary public. (R., 00026-00027.) 
By its terms, the Property Settlement Agreement reveals that the parties intended it to be merged 
into the Judgment and Decree of Divorce. 
In Phillips v. Phillips, 93 Idaho 384,462 P.2d 49 (1969), this Court noted that 
When parties enter into an agreement of separation in 
contemplation of divorce and thereafter the agreement is presented 
to a District Court in which a divorce action is pending and the 
court is requested to approve, ratify or confirm the agreement, 
certain presumptions arise. In the absence of clear and convincing 
evidence to the contrary, it will be presumed that each provision of 
such an agreement is independent of all other provisions and that 
RESPONDENT'SICROSS-APPELLANT'S BRIEF P -20- 
such agreement is not integrated; it will be further presumed that 
the agreement is merged into the decree of divorce, is enforceable 
as a part thereof and if necessary may be modified by the court in 
the future. 
Phillips, at 387,462 P.2d at 52. 
Neither the magistrate court nor the district court was faced with clear and convincing 
evidence overcoming the presumption of merger as set forth in Phillips. Again, the Property 
Settlement Agreement executed by the parties before a notary public on September 15,2005 and 
September 16,2005 respectively, confirms that it was to be "merged and incorporated and made 
a part of the Judgment and Decree of Divorce." (R., 00024,n 10.) 
Inexplicably, however, the September 22, 2005 Judgment and Decree of Divorce states 
that although the Property Settlement Agreement "is approved by this Court, ... it is not merged 
nor incorporated into this Judgment and Decree of Divorce." (R., 00019-00020.) Faced with this 
contradiction of terms, the magistrate court and the district court reached the same conclusion: 
there was no clear and convincing evidence to support the non-merger of the Property Settlement 
Agreement. 
Consequently, the magistrate court, along with the district court, correctly characterized 
the ambiguity contained within the Judgment and Decree of Divorce and the Property Settlement 
Agreement: 
Smith argues that because the language in the Judgment and 
Divorce Decree is unambiguous, the Court must exercise free 
review over the magistrate court's decision. This argument is 
misplaced. It is true that the language of the divorce decree when 
taken alone is unambiguous, but in making his determination the 
magistrate court considered both the agreement and the decree. 
When these two documents are read together they are ambiguous 
as to the parties' intent. Consequently, their interpretation is a 
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question of fact and the Court must review the magistrate court's 
findings only to determine whether they were based on substantial 
and competent evidence. The Court finds his findings are based on 
substantial competent evidence and, therefore, the Court upholds 
his determination. 
(R., 00060-00061 .) 
The presumption set forth in Phillips controls. The lack of clear and convincing evidence 
mandates that the Property Settlement Agreement was merged into the parties September 22, 
2005 Judgment and Decree of Divorce. Based on the above, the lower courts did not err in 
reaching the conclusion that the Property Settlement Agreement was merged in the September 
22,2005 Judgment and Decree of Divorce. 
2. Neither the Magistrate Court nor the District Court Modified the 
Jud~ment and Decree of Divorce. 
At the outset, it should be noted that contrary to Kevin's assertion, whether the Property 
Settlement Agreement was merged into the September 22, 2005 Judgment and Decree of 
Divorce is a non-issue in light of the relief originally sought by Debra. Again, Debra filed a 
Motion To Divide Omitted Asset; she did not seek "modification" of the Judgment and Decree 
of Divorce. (A.R., p. 1, No. 1.) The magistrate court clearly had the authority and jurisdiction to 
grant Debra's Motion to Divide Omitted Asset. After all, an action for divorce is an action in 
equity. See McHugh v. McHugh, 115 Idaho 198,200,766 P.2d 133, 135 (1988) (citing Rudd v. 
Rudd, 105 Idaho 112,666 P.2d 639 (1983)). 
"Further, equity having obtained jurisdiction of the subject matter of a dispute, will retain 
it for the settlement of all controversies between the parties with respect thereto and will grant all 
proper relief whether prayed for or not." Id. (citing Boesiger v. Freer, 85 Idaho 551, 563, 381 
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P.2d 802, 809 (1963)) Citing Barnard & Son, Inc., v. Atkins, 109 Idaho 466,469,708 P.2d 871, 
874 (1985), this Court stated, "General maxims of equity dictate that once the equitable 
jurisdiction of the court has attached, the court should retain jurisdiction to resolve all portions of 
the dispute between the parties and render equity to all parties." McHugh, supra, at 200, 766 
P.2d at 135. This Court, citing with approval to several California cases, noted that '"tlhe courts 
accord special treatment in equity actions, and that an action to divide an omitted asset in the 
context of a divorce proceeding is an action in equity, and that such does not seek to modify or 
reopen the previous final judgment of dissolution." Id 
Debra merely requested that the magistrate court divide an omitted asset; she did not, nor 
is she currently, asking any court to modify the September 22, 2005 Judgment and Decree of 
Divorce. Debra's Motion to Divide Omitted Asset, by its terms, sought division of assets 
(convertible notes and stock allocations) that were not included in the September 22, 2005 
Judgment and Decree of Divorce, nor considered by the parties prior to executing the Property 
Settlement Agreement attached thereto. Even if this Court finds that the Property Settlement 
Agreement was not merged and incorporated into the parties' September 22,2005 Judgment and 
Decree of Divorce, that fact alone did not eliminate the magistrate court's jurisdiction to divide 
the same as omitted assets. 
By definition, "omitted" means that it was not included. Importantly, the magistrate 
court stated the following: 
This court believes that in fact this is not an omitted asset 
but rather controlled by paragraph four under the division of 
retirement benefit and specifically under amounts to be received 
from United Airlines. 
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If however, this matter is appealed and it is determined 
that in fact this is not to be considered under paragraph four 
then this court would rule that in fact this was an omitted asset 
and require the division as set forth above. 
(R., 00039, fly 4-5.) (Emphasis added.) Thus, the magistrate court concluded that the convertible 
notes fell under paragraph four of the Property Settlement agreement and should be divided as 
set forth therein, or, at the very least, constituted an "omitted asset." Either way, the magistrate 
court determined that this asset needed to be divided. 
The underlying principle of Idaho law is that property acquired during the course of 
marriage should be divided equitably between the parties pursuant to I.C. 5 32-712. Both the 
magistrate court and the district court attempted to do just that. Therefore, the lower courts' 
decisions concerning the division of the convertible notes should be upheld and said notes should 
he divided pursuant to the "time rule" formula: number of months that Kevin and Debra were 
married while Kevin was employed by United divided by the number of months that Kevin was 
employed by United, multiplied by convertible notes received multiplied by one-half equals 
Debra's share. 
3. The Convertible Notes and the Stock Allocations Represent 
Communitv Properly Assets Pursuant to Paragra~h 4 of the 
Properly Settlement Agreement or Omitted Assets Which Should 
Be Divided. 
Contrary to Kevin's position, neither the convertible notes nor the stock allocations 
represent Kevin's separate property. The stipulated facts make it very clear that the convertible 
notes and the stock allocations received by Kevin represented undivided community assets. 
Again, the convertible notes were provided to United pilots, including Kevin, as a partial 
offset to the losses suffered as a result of termination of their A Plan. (A.R., No. 10, p. 5 fl 10.) 
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Moreover, in order to qualify for these convertible notes, Kevin had to have been a qualified 
member of the A Plan as of December 30, 2004. (A.R., No. 10, p. 6, 1 16.) Kevin began 
working for United as a pilot in October of 1990. (A.R., No. 10, p. 2, 7 2.) Kevin was a 
qualified member of the United "A Plan" as of December 30,2004. (A.R., No. 10, p. 5, fjTl 10 
and 11, and p. 6, T 16.) To be perfectly clear, the convertible notes represented an attempt by 
United to appease their pilots as a result of the loss of their "A Plan." (A.R., No. 10, p. 5,77 10, 
11 and 13.) This fact is further borne out by the following: 
7. Convertible Notes. In the event that the A plan is 
terminated pursuant to 29 U.S.C. 5 1341 or 5 1342 following 
judicial approval of such termination, the revised 2003 Pilot 
Agreement and the Plan of Reorganization shall provide for the 
issuance of $550 Million of UAL convertible notes as described in 
Exhibit " D  to this letter of agreement to a trust or other entity 
designated by the Association. The terms of the UAL convertible 
notes described in Exhibit "D" shall be subject to mutually 
acceptable modifications to optimize implementation for all parties 
from an accounting, securities law and tax law perspective. 
Like the convertible notes, the stock allocations also represented an attempt by United to 
compensate their pilots for losses suffered as a result of restructuring. (A.R., No. 10, p. 6,T 15.) 
In order for a pilot, like Kevin, to receive the stock allocations, he must have been employed on 
May 1, 2003. (A.R., No. 10, p. 6,fl 14.) Kevin easily qualified for these stock allocations as his 
continuing employment with United began in October of 1990. (A.R., No. 10, p. 2, fl 2.) 
Consequently, Kevin received multiple stock allocations following United's emergence from 
bankruptcy in February of 2006. (A.R., No. 10, p. 5 at flT 9, 10, 1 1  and 12.) These allocations 
represented compensation that Kevin lost as a result of the restructuring of his collective 
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bargaining agreement, which runs from May 1, 2003 through December 31, 2009. (A.R., No. 
10, p 6,7  15.) 
Neither the 2003 Restructured Agreement, nor any subsequent letters, required United 
pilots to maintain their employment after receipt of the convertible notes and/or stock allocations 
in question. (A.R., No. 10, p. 7, 7 18.) In fact, pilots could immediately terminate their 
employment following receipt of the convertible notes and/or stock allocations, without being 
required to return any of the funds. (A.R., No. 10, p. 7, 7 18.) Although based in part on 
projections of one kind or another, it is undisputed that these community assets were received by 
Kevin, did not need to be returned by Kevin, were earned during the parties' marriage, and 
would represent a windfall to Kevin if he is permitted to retain an undivided interest in the same. 
These undivided assets need to be divided pursuant to paragraph 4 of the Property Settlement 
Agreement, or divided as "omitted assets" pursuant to Debra's earlier motion. 
The funds generated by the convertible notes, as well as the stock allocations, do not 
represent post-divorce income. The undisputed facts in this case make it impossible for Kevin to 
assert otherwise. Kevin and Debra were married while United was in bankruptcy, and while 
these benefits and protections were being negotiated on Kevin's behalf as a United pilot. (A.R., 
No. 10.) As set forth in the Judgment and Decree of Divorce, the parties were not divorced until 
September 22, 2005. (R., 00019.) Therefore, the convertible notes and stock allocations 
represent community assets, which should have been divided via the September 22, 2005 
Judgment and Decree of Divorce but were not. 
Notwithstanding the above, however, Kevin asserts that the "stock allocation [he] 
received is clearly income he acquired after the filing of the Judgment and Decree of Divorce on 
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September 22, 2005, ..." because he "did not become the owner of the stock allocation until 
February 1, 2006." (Appellant's Brief, p. 11, 7 5.) Kevin's reliance on mere receipt is 
misplaced. As the facts demonstrate, Kevin and Debra acquired the right to the convertible notes 
and stock allocations on May 1, 2003 and December 30, 2004 respectively. (A.R., No. 10, p. 6, 
11 14, 15 and 16.) In other words, Kevin and Debra "acquired" the rights to the convertible 
notes and the stock allocations many months prior to their September 22,2005 divorce. 
In Batra v. Batra, 135 Idaho 388, 17 P.3d 889 (2001), the Idaho Supreme Court rejected 
an argument similar to Kevin's "because it ignores a basic proposition of community property 
law [that] 'income derived from a husband's or wife's efforts, labor and industry' during the 
marriage is community property." Id., at 393, 17 P.3d at 894; citing Hiatt v. Hiat  94 Idaho 367, 
368,487 P.2d 1 121, 1 121 (1971); Wood v. Wood, 124 Idaho 12,15 855 P.2d 473,476 (Ct. App. 
1993). The stock allocations as well as the convertible notes, represented compensation earned 
during the marriage: 
7. Convertible Notes. In the event that the A plan is 
terminated pursuant to 29 U.S.C. 1341 or 5 1342 following 
judicial approval of such termination, the revised 2003 Pilot 
Agreement and the Plan of Reorganization shall provide for the 
issuance of $550 Million of UAL convertible notes as described in 
Exhibit " D  to this letter of agreement to a trust or other entity 
designated by the Association. The terms of the UAL convertible 
notes described in Exhibit " D  shall be subject to mutually 
acceptable modifications to optimize implementation for all parties 
from an accounting, securities law and tax law perspective. 
15. The stock distributions/stock allocations that each eligible 
pilot received attempted to compensate the pilots for the work 
rules, compensation, and work benefits that they lost as a result of 
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restructuring their collective bargaining agreement, which is to run 
from May 1,2003 through December 3 1,2009. 
17. In determining a pilot's share of the convertible note 
allocations/distributions, United took into account each pilot's age, 
years left to retirement (which is reached at age 60) and seniority. 
United projected that the more seniority a pilot had, the greater the 
projection as to the aircraft that helshe would be flying at 
retirement. A pilot projected to be flying a 777 at the time of his 
retirement versus a pilot that would be flying an A320 would be 
entitled to a greater allocation of convertible notes assuming that 
the pilots were of the same age. The one with greater seniority 
would be projected to be flying a more advanced aircraft with 
higher pay. 
To reiterate, the parties were divorced on September 22, 2005. Kevin began to receive 
the stock allocations in February of 2006, a mere five months later. The stock allocations 
represented compensation for "the pilots for work rules, compensation and work benefits that 
they lost as a result of restructuring their collective bargaining agreement" between May 1, 2003 
and December 31, 2009. For all but five months of Kevin's employment, he was married to 
Debra. Clearly, these allocations constituted community income and therefore, pursuant to 
Batra, supra., the community interest in the same should be divided pursuant to the Batra 
formula, 
4. The District Court Did Not Err When it Reversed the Magistrate 
Court on the Issue of Whether the Stock Allocations Constitutes 
an Omitted Asset. 
In pertinent part, the magistrate court's October 10, 2007 Memorandum Decision, states 
the following: 
With regards to the stock allocation, it is clear to this court 
pursuant to the February 9, 2006 letter marked Exhibit "3" to 
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Matthew Bohn's Affidavit of April 16, 2007, the income received 
from the sale of United stock was paid to the pilots because they 
gave up significant compensation pursuant to work rules, work 
benefits and regular compensation to allow for United airlines to 
go through and exit bankruptcy. 
Regardless of the above, it is clear from Debra's deposition taken 
on February 9, 2007 that she was well aware of United Airlines 
offers to compensate the pilots during the bankruptcy in order to 
resolve the restructuring issues facing United Airlines. 
Debra specifically testified that she understood that sometime in 
the future the pilots of United Airlines including Kevin could 
possibly be compensated for them having their retirement taken 
away and agreeing to pay cuts during the restructuring. 
Debra also testified that she was specifically aware of this 
possibility when she and Kevin entered into the settlement 
agreement that is the subject of this litigation. 
Therefore, based on the Stipulated Facts and the deposition of 
Debra and United Airlines documents reviewed by this court, it is 
clear that the stock allocation would fall under paragraph 13 of the 
Property Settlement Agreement and would be Kevin's sole and 
separate property. 
(R .  00039-00040.) Incorrectly, the magistrate court failed to recognize Debra's 
undisputed/uncontroverted testimony that the stock allocations were not included in the Property 
Settlement Agreement because Debra was "emotionally distraught" due to Kevin's 
unfaithfulness. (A.R., No. 10, p. 7, 7 21, and A.R., No. 16, Exh. 5 (Deposition of Debra A. 
Borley, taken February 9,2007, p. 19, L1. 13-25, p. 20, L1. 1-2).) 
Further, it is also uncontroverted that Kevin did not raise any issues or volunteer any 
information about the convertible notes andor stock allocations that he would be receiving in the 
near future at the time the parties executed the Property Settlement Agreement. (A.R., No. 10, p. 
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7, 721, and A.R., No. 16, Exh. 5 (Deposition of Debra A. Borley, taken February 9,2007, p. 19, 
The mere fact that Debra knew at one point in time that Kevin would be receiving "stock 
allocations" at some point in the future, does not prevent the magistrate court from dividing the 
same as an omitted asset at a later date. 
As the district court correctly pointed out: 
An examination of the stipulated facts reveals that the stock 
ailocations were meant to compensate United Airlines' pilots for 
"the work rules, compensation, and work benefits that they lost as 
a result of restructuring their collective bargaining agreement, 
which is to run from May 1, 2003 through December 31, 2009." 
Presumably, a portion of the stock ailocations received by Smith 
represented the loss of work rules, compensation, and work 
benefits suffered between May 1,2003 and the date of the divorce. 
This portion is clearly community property not covered by the 
terms of the settlement agreement. As such, it is an omitted asset 
and must be divided equitably between the parties. 
Furthermore, Idaho courts have rejected Smith's argument 
that since vesting of the stock allocations was contingent upon his 
continued employment through February 1, 2006, the allocations 
constituted separate property. Batra, 135 Idaho at 393 17 P.3d at 
894 (finding that stock options which vested after date of divorce 
were partially eamed from the piaintiff-appellant's labor during 
marriage and, thus, the community had a fractional interest in the 
stock options vesting in the months following the divorce). 
(R., 00064-00065.) At the very least, the district court recognized that the stock allocations 
represented a loss resulting from a change in work rules, compensation and benefits suffered by 
United pilots, including Kevin, between May 1, 2003 and the date of the parties' divorce, 
September 22,2005. (R., 00064-00065.) 
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In 1994, the Idaho Court of Appeals noted that "Most jurisdictions hold that if a final 
decree of divorce fails to dispose of community property, the former spouses own the omitted 
property equally as tenants in common." Clark v Clark, 125 Idaho 173, 175,868 P.2d 501,503 
(Ct.App. 1994). The Court of Appeals further noted that "It is not strictly accurate to define this 
ownership after divorce by common-law terms, such as tenancy in common, ... it is rather a form 
of joint ownership, peculiar to the civil law community property system." Id. (citing 
DeFUNIAK, Principles of Community Property 5 229 (2d ed. 1971)). 
This Court has held that "It is well established that without an appeal from an original 
decree of divorce the property division portions of that decree are final, res judicata, and no 
jurisdiction exists to modify property provisions of a divorce decree." Ratkowski v. Ratkowski, 
115 Idaho 692, 693, 769 P.2d 569, 570 (1989). However, this Court further explained that it is 
not a modification of a divorce decree when the court is enforcing the terms of its own decree. 
See Id at 694, 769 P.2d at 571. In support of its finding that a court has continuing jurisdiction 
to enforce its orders, this Court stated: 
This general principle is codified in Idaho Code 5 1-1622, which 
provides: 
Incidental Means to Exercise Jurisdiction. - When 
jurisdiction is, by this code, or by any other statute, 
conferred on a court or judicial officer all the means 
necessary to carry it into effect are also given; and 
in exercise of the jurisdiction if the course of 
proceedings be not specifically pointed out by this 
code, or the statute, any suitable process or mode of 
proceeding may be adopted which may appear most 
conformable to the spirit of this code. 
The nature of continuing jurisdiction was outlined in McDonald v 
McDonald, 55 Idaho 102, 114,39 P.2d 293,298 (1934): 
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The court having jurisdiction of both the subject 
matter and person of the defendants, has the right 
and authority to hear and determine all questions 
that occur in the case and are essential to a decision 
of the merits of the issues, and it likewise has 
authority and jurisdiction to make such orders and 
issues such writs as may be necessary and essential 
to carry the decree into effect and render it binding 
and operative. 
Ratkowski, supra at 694,769, P.2d at 571 
As the above-cited case law sets forth, and most particularly Ratkowski, supra, holds, the 
magistrate court has continuing jurisdiction to enforce the September 22, 2005 Decree to carry 
out the Decree's division of the property in question. The mere fact that Debra forgot to include 
the convertible notes and/or the stock allocations in the Property Settlement Agreement should 
not prevent the lower court from dividing the omitted asset. Kevin should not receive a windfall 
as a result of his intentional failure to raise the stock allocations issue, at worst, or receive a 
windfall because he forgot, like Debra, to include the stock allocation in the Property Settlement 
Agreement, at best. Again, by definition, "omitted" means that the asset was not included. The 
district court properly reversed the magistrate court with respect to the stock allocations. 
5. Issue on Cross-Appeal -Attornev Fees 
On November 20, 2007, the magistrate court entered an order granting in part and 
denying in part Plaintiffs Motion to Divide an Omitted Asset, and on September 10, 2008, the 
district court entered its Decision on Appeal. Both the magistrate court and the district court 
concluded that Debra owned an interest in the convertible notes and/or stock allocations. Prior to 
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the lower courts' respective rulings, Debra did not have a recognized interest in either. For this 
reason, Debra should be considered the prevailing party. 
Paragraph 15.03 of the Property Settlement Agreement, cited above, states that the 
prevailing party is entitled to all costs and attorney fees incurred in bringing an action: 
15.03 If an action is instituted to enforce any of the terms of this 
Agreement, then the losing party agrees to pay to the prevailing 
& all costs and attorneys' fees incurred in that action. 
(R., 00025.) (emphasis added). 
It is clear that Debra had to file the Motion to Divide Omitted Asset andlor seek 
enforcement of the Property Settlement Agreement, since Kevin refused to agree to a division of 
the convertible notes and/or stock allocations. In the event this Court affirms the district court 
and/or the magistrate court, Debra should be the prevailing party as defined by paragraph 15.03 
of the parties' Property Settlement Agreement. 
A settlement agreement that is merged and incorporated into a decree of divorce that 
provides for the award of attorney fees "is valid and enforceable as such." Noble v. Fisher, 126 
Idaho 885, 891, 894 P.2d 118, 124 (1995). As this Court held in that case, "the clear and 
unambiguous import of [the attorney fee] provision is that if the parties subsequently dispute the 
terms of the settlement agreement--their applicability, modifiability, enforceability, or meaning-- 
then the party who prevails in the dispute is entitled to have his or her attorney fees paid by the 
losing party." Id, at 892,894 P.2d at 125. 
As with the Property Settlement Agreement executed by the parties in this instant matter, 
the attorney fee provision in the Noble case provided that "if any action is instituted under the 
terms of this agreement, then the losing party agrees to pay the prevailing party his or her costs 
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and reasonable attorney fees.. .." Id. at 891, 894 P.2d at 124. This Court affirmed the magistrate 
court's award of attorney fees to the wife pursuant to the parties' settlement agreement, even 
though it had not granted her requests for an award of attorney fees pursuant to either Idaho 
Code § 12-121 or Idaho Code 4 32-704. Similarly, this Court should award Debra her attorney 
fees pursuant to the parties' stipulated enforceable agreement that attorney fees be awarded to the 
prevailing party set forth in Paragraph 15.03 of the Property Settlement Agreement. 
v. 
CONCLUSION 
The magistrate court and the district court properly concluded that the convertible notes 
represented community property that should be divided by Paragraph 4 of the Property 
Settlement Agreement, or, in the alternative, represented an omitted asset that should be divided 
pursuant to the time rule method. The district court also properly reversed the magistrate court 
by finding that the stock allocations represented omitted assets that should have been divided. 
Based on the above, Debra respectfully requests that this Court affirm the decision of the district 
court with respect to the convertible notes and the stock allocations. 
Debra also respectfully requests that this Court reverse both the magistrate court and the 
district court with respect to her request for attorney fees and costs pursuant to paragraph 15.03 
of the Property Settlement Agreement. 
Finally, Debra requests that she be awarded all of her attorney fees on appeal pursuant to 
Idaho Appellate Rules 35(a)(5), 40, 41 and paragraph 15.03 of the Property Settlement 
Agreement. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this 5th day of May, 2009. 
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